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CHAPTER 6 
Polemos and Agon 
 
Alex Thomson 
 
Agonist political theorists stress not only the irreducibility but the centrality of conflict to 
democratic politics. This sets them apart from pluralist or deliberative democrats who may 
acknowledge the impossibility of eliminating disputes, but whose efforts are directed towards 
institutions and processes which would foster co-operation and reconciliation rather than 
sustain antagonism. To an agonist, this is to commit one of two possible errors. Either it 
entails taking a weaker position, which may leave us exposed to the violent opposition of 
those who do not recognize the common space within which we offer to negotiate; or it 
deploys that sleight of hand whereby the most violent position, which seeks to extirpate its 
opponents from the political field, masquerades as the most peaceful. In contrast, agonist 
thinkers aim to remap our understanding of democracy in such a way that conflict becomes 
not that which politics seeks to eliminate but its very principle. 
Agonists are neither terrorists nor nihilists. They are not interested in violence for its 
own sake, nor in the purging fire which dominates the revolutionary tradition. Indeed, the 
problems that the agonists confront are recognizable as those which have preoccupied both 
liberal theorists and their opponents in recent decades: tensions arising from competing 
demands for cultural recognition within the liberal state; questions of legitimation raised by 
declining political participation; the justification and universality of liberal principles. 
Standing on the banks of what they portray as the mainstream of contemporary Western 
political thought, they seek to revitalize rather than overthrow the democratic tradition. But 
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because they diagnose a complicity between liberal political thought and the problems facing 
modern democratic states, agonist positions polemicize against both the city and the academy. 
This lends a pre-eminently theoretical discussion the allure of urgency and opposition but 
opens it to the risk of conflating the two spheres and substituting debate within the academy 
for action within the city. My aim in the first part of this essay will be to identify those 
features which distinguish the agonist attempt to resolve these questions, and in particular to 
examine critically their call for something like a ‘return’ to politics. 
Agonist arguments are, to use James Tully’s (1995, 44) terms, ‘non-authoritative in the 
sense that they did not develop along with the formation of contemporary constitutional 
societies and their language of self-understanding’. Like many counter-movements in the 
history of Western political theory, their position is articulated as a reinterpretation of the 
democratic tradition, signalled by the anachronistic lexicon deriving from the Greek term 
agōn. Although I acknowledge that to some extent there is merely a family resemblance 
between those theorists who have invoked this vocabulary, that shared rhetoric alone would 
be enough to justify the comparison. It points us towards common reference points in the 
work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt, as well as their concern to rearticulate the 
relationship between the theory, practice and language of political encounter. 
In Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future John Dunn (1979, 28) writes: ‘If 
we are all democrats today, it is not a very cheerful fate to share. Today, in politics, 
“democracy” is the name for what we cannot have – yet cannot cease to want.’ Dunn seeks to 
restore our sense that democracy can and should mean autonomy, self-rule. But in complex 
social systems our experience of politics is largely that of tacit assent, and the choice between 
alternative forms of rule by others. If this is indeed our fate, then the question posed by the 
agonists must be a genuine one. Their work can be sympathetically understood as an attempt 
to reshape the modern political imaginary and in particular to effect a break between our 
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understanding of democratic politics and its current domination by the horizon of the modern 
state. However, in my account of the agonist position, I will seek to show what I take to be the 
limits of this political re-imagining. In the remainder of my essay I will sketch an alternative 
position, which I associate with a vocabulary deriving not from agōn but from polemos. 
Agonist arguments rely on a rethinking of social theory which presents itself as a modest 
rejection of philosophy as metaphysics; I characterize in terms of polemos the deconstructive 
renewal of specifically philosophical, hence metaphysical, questioning deriving from the 
project of Martin Heidegger and exemplified in the work of Jacques Derrida. Contra the 
agonists, I will argue for an aporetic disjunction between philosophical and political enquiry; 
drawing on Derrida’s political writings I will offer a sketch of a philosophical indifference to 
politics which is neither a rejection of political engagement nor the replacement of politics by 
theory.  
 
The Limits of Agonism 
Precedent for identifying a distinctive agonist position might be drawn from Seyla Benhabib’s 
‘Introduction’ to a collection of essays entitled Democracy and Difference: Contesting the 
Boundaries of the Political. She identifies ‘a tension’ between ‘defenders of the proceduralist-
deliberative model of democracy’ and the ‘the agonistic model of democratic politics’ 
(Benhabib 1996, 7). The context is helpful for situating what is at stake. Broadly speaking, all 
the contributors to the volume seek to move beyond the narrowly conceived alternative of 
liberal or communitarian politics. Liberalism, represented in its pre-eminent modern form by 
the work of John Rawls, seeks to develop a rational legitimation of decision-making processes 
in which the best possible balance between competing interests can be achieved. The aim of 
the theorist is to help guide the political community towards those institutions and practices 
for which the greatest possible consent amongst citizens can be established, owing to their 
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identification with an ideal of public reason. Communitarian critics of this model emphasize 
the fragility of a merely theoretical ideal, suggesting that security and consensus can best be 
derived from the alignment of political process with the pre-political sentiments of a 
community considered as relatively homogeneous in culture. As the subtitle suggests, both 
deliberative and agonist theorists challenge the identification of politics with the state. 
Deliberative democrats seek to thicken the decision-making process by engaging wider forms 
of public discussion throughout civil society to consolidate, and where appropriate to 
challenge, the state. To give the position a minimal preliminary definition, an agonist opposes 
the institutional emphasis of this theory, and identifies democracy as a political principle that 
cannot be directly aligned with a particular regime. Democracy as self-rule becomes 
something more like an ethic, or what Sheldon Wolin (1996, 43) in his contribution calls ‘a 
mode of being’; but this emphasis on democracy also suggests, as Richard Flathman (1998, 
14) notes, a potential tension between agonists and more individualistic or voluntarist liberal 
thinkers. 
In other words, agonists aim to redefine the relationship between democracy and 
politics. They share with many other critical analyses on both left and right a sense that 
modern democracy is not living up to its name. What makes their position distinctive is that it 
calls for a revitalization of modern democratic culture not in terms of the articulation of public 
goods which exceed partisan interests, but through a celebration of the continuous conflict of 
those interests. Agonists deny the possibility of a common good which can be distinguished 
from power relations within society, and claim that the attempt to articulate such a good must 
itself be interested. Because they deny the possibility or desirability of citizens being able to 
free themselves from their attachment to social groups subsidiary to the larger political 
community, or whose borders overflow those of the polis, they can only articulate a 
distinctive political virtue in terms of the value of political conflict itself. 
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A correlative of the agonist position is the demand to rethink the relationship between 
political theory and democratic practice. Insistence on the persistence of power relations 
implies a distrust of any attempt to objectively map those relations. Through a conflation of 
academic liberal political theory with the rhetoric of consensus in contemporary Western 
political discourse, agonists portray agonist arguments as a virtuous attempt to foster the kind 
of pluralism they advocate, grounded in practices rather than institutions. So in addition to 
calling for a rethinking of the relationship between politics and democracy, agonism demands 
a rethinking of the relationship between politics and its ground, reconceived not as theoretical, 
but as practical. The appeal of Nietzsche for agonists is that his major legacy to the twentieth 
century has been his challenge to the primacy of theory; the appeal of Arendt, her grounding 
of politics in action.  
On this basis we can identify some exemplary claims. Bonnie Honig begins her 
Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics with the statement: 
I look to Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt to provide the contrasting alternative, a perspective from 
which agonistic conflict is celebrated and the identification or conflation of politics with administration is 
charged with closing down the agon, or with duplicitously participating in its contests while pretending to 
rise above them. (Honig 1993, 2) 
For Chantal Mouffe (2000, 101, 103), the modern conception of ‘“politics” consists in 
domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human 
relations’, but agonistic pluralists acknowledge ‘that, far from jeopardizing democracy, 
agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence’. William Connolly (2002, x) 
argues that agonistic democracy is a ‘practice’ that ‘breaks with the democratic idealism of 
communitarianism through its refusal to equate concern for human dignity with a quest for 
rational consensus’. Agonism means safeguarding the space in which antagonistic social 
forces fail to subdue one another; it ‘affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs 
the dogmatization of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the 
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strife and interdependence of identity/difference’ (Connolly 2002, x). 
We are now in a position to see how the two most characteristic strategies of agonist 
thinkers are linked. To understand justice as strife is to repudiate the attempt by theoretical 
reason to divine the harmonious order to which politics ought to approximate, or to seek to 
deduce political institutions on an axiomatic basis. Because agonists suspect descriptive 
approaches to politics of a normative bias, agonism requires something like a theoretical 
attack on theory. The tendency to distinguish contemporary democratic politics from 
something like a political ground or essence serves as both a polemical contestation of the 
positions they identify with the failures of modern politics and a problematically theoretical 
move designed to reverse the priority of theory over practice. 
That the basic orientation of agonist thinking is towards a new ground for politics is 
evident in the work of both William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe. Connolly’s pluralism is 
more explicitly grounded in an attempt to rethink ontology along contemporary Spinozist 
lines. Here the attack on metaphysics is an attack on transcendence in the name of 
immanence. Mouffe’s position towards ontology is more ambiguous because it remains 
attached to the idea of critical social science rather than metaphysics. However the absent 
‘centre’ and openness of the social functions as a ground equivalent to that of Connolly’s 
ontology. This appeal to ontology, however tentative, is necessary to ensure that agonism 
advocates antagonism as such rather than any particular antagonism: when forms of speech 
are identified with forms of life the claim to describe the whole field still rests on the ability 
of one way of talking to articulate relations between all those ways, and thus the tentative 
establishment of a meta-language. 
Agonism replaces the idea of a public good with ‘politics’ itself as an abstract value 
deprived of any content, except for the pragmatic virtues of pluralism and tolerance. Via this 
substitution, a minority group which identifies itself with politics itself can operate what we 
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might call an immanent critique of what passes for politics in ordinary language. The spectre 
of Carl Schmitt haunts the discourse on agonism insofar as the reinvigoration of politics 
promised by the agonist depends on a prior denunciation of the present appearance of politics 
as banal management. As Agnes Heller (1991, 331) has pointed out, the need for a concept of 
the political only arises ‘once the birth of modern mass democracy finally rendered obsolete 
the equation of political class with political action’. Only then does ‘the question concerning 
the character of “the political” appear on the agenda; for a criterion for determining which 
actions, phenomena and institutions are of political provenance and which are not, had to be 
found.’ Heller’s comments suggest that for all its appeal to tradition, agonism is distinctively 
‘modern’. This is equally apparent from its obsession with epistemology cast as the question 
of the foundations of politics and of political theory; the desire for a new ground echoes the 
desire for the unity of theory and practice characteristic of both the rationalist approach of the 
Kantian and the radical approach of the revolutionary. 
In my account of the agonistic position I have stressed three elements that distinguish 
the agonist from the liberal, deliberative or communitarian democrat: their insistence on 
conflict; that conflict be understood not as a contingent feature of politics but as its 
constitutive and distinctive feature; and their epistemological concern to re-ground the 
theoretical discussion of politics. Because of the latter, their understanding of conflict cannot 
go all the way down: which is to suggest that they seek to induce theoretical agreement 
regarding the grounds on which they commend political conflict. It makes little difference 
whether that attempt to persuade is considered a matter of reason or rhetoric: if the former, 
theory still precedes politics and the model of justice which the agonist contests has not been 
overturned; if the latter, the emphasis on disagreement rather than consensus becomes merely 
a matter of preference. The most charitable reading would see agonism as a tactical attempt to 
challenge the discourse of liberalism from within, in keeping with Richard Rorty’s 
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redescription of philosophy as persuasion; but even if the purported alliance of theoretical and 
political radicalism merely provides exoteric cover, the political valence of its rhetorical pose 
remains to be reckoned. Like Leo Strauss (1964, 1), the agonists imply that a political theory 
is ‘the rightful queen of the social sciences, the sciences of man and human affairs’. But 
Strauss is perhaps more open about the limits of philosophy and the political role of 
persuasion. 
 
Polemos against Agōn 
I turn now to Heidegger and Derrida, in order to sketch an alternative position to that of 
agonism. Heidegger is of interest for two reasons. Firstly, because it is sometimes said that his 
thought lies behind much recent writing on the relationship between politics and philosophy, 
including that of the agonists. In particular, the ontic-ontological difference has been taken as 
the ur-form of the distinction between politics and the political. For example Mouffe directly 
identifies ‘current practices of democratic politics’ as ‘located at the “ontic” level’ and ‘“the 
political”’ with ‘the ontological dimension’ (2005, 9). Secondly, the comparison is 
illuminating because Heidegger’s understanding of polemos is specifically cast as a struggle 
with Nietzsche. To look at the tension between agōn and polemos is to tease out two 
interpretations of Nietzsche. I conclude with a discussion of Derrida because his work stands 
in a similar relationship to Heidegger as Heidegger’s mature thought does to Nietzsche. 
Understood as part of his long confrontation with Heidegger, Derrida’s own political writings 
offer the possibility of extending the specifically philosophical orientation which I identify 
with polemos rather than agōn, but raising anew the question of philosophy’s constitutive and 
aporetic relationship to politics. 
Heidegger distinguishes between ontic and ontological questions in Being and Time. An 
ontic enquiry concerns a particular type of beings and presumes an ontological decision as to 
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the mode of being of those beings. For example, the natural sciences take various aspects of 
nature as their object, relying on certain guiding assumptions which stabilize and regulate the 
enquiry. Heidegger is clear that the task of philosophy is that of fundamental ontology, or 
enquiry into being itself, a question which is both prior to, and unavailable from, any regional 
ontology. By contrast, Mouffe distinguishes something more like a transhistorical idea of 
politics as the conflictual mediation of social antagonism from any particular historical or 
ideological ‘content’ that might be confused with it. The distinction is necessary to any 
structural or functional analysis which seeks to suspend judgement as to what constitutes a 
‘proper’ form of political activity. In this sense, Mouffe is post-structuralist in her advocacy 
of this methodological practice, along with its theoretical self-understanding, as in and of 
itself a political ideal.  
In asking what makes a political event political, Mouffe departs from Heidegger’s 
project; his focus would be rather on what makes it an event. In his work following Being and 
Time, the only philosophical question becomes why there ‘are beings at all instead of nothing’ 
(Heidegger 2000, 1). But even the early Heidegger demands a suspension of the ‘ontic’ 
sciences, and their ‘ontological’ underpinnings, in the name of philosophy reconceived as 
fundamental ontology: 
The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility 
of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type, and, in so doing, already 
operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves 
which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations. Basically, all ontology, no 
matter how rich and firmly compacted a series of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and 
perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and 
conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (Heidegger 1962, 31 – Heidegger’s emphasis) 
To stress polemos rather than agōn is to reiterate Heidegger’s own insistence that philosophy 
— that is enquiry after truth rather than rhetorical persuasion or a historical science — 
depends on thinking the ontological difference, that is the difference between Being and any 
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determinate beings. Stephen K. White (2000, 14) offers a succinct formulation of this position 
as a possible objection to ontologies such as those of Mouffe and Connolly: ‘Ontology should 
refer only to the study of the question: What is being? And ontology is intrinsically concerned 
with a true answer to this single question.’ 
It is later in the development of Heidegger’s thinking that the term polemos, which 
Heidegger translates as Auseinandersetzung, comes into play. The term will itself require 
translation. In the preamble to his careful and extensive study, Gregory Fried (Fried 2000, 16–
19) distinguishes at least seven different senses in which aspects of Heidegger’s own project 
can be helpfully identified with the term. Here I will largely be concerned with two. Firstly, 
with polemos as a term for the general strife of Being. As such it is that towards which 
Heidegger’s thinking is directed, but also that which is covered up in both everyday life and in 
traditional metaphysical enquiry. But crucially, polemos is also a term for Heidegger’s way of 
thinking, for that deconstruction by which the absent presence of the truth is experienced in 
thought (see also Van Roermund in this volume). So to compare polemos with agōn is to 
contrast not only two different objects, Being as the cosmic strife within which human 
existence and political life takes place as distinct from any of the manifold historical forms of 
human life, but two different manners of enquiry. 
Heidegger clearly distinguishes the thinking of polemos from that of agōn in his lecture 
course on Parmenides and Anaximander, given in 1943. Like the agonists, he acknowledges 
an indebtedness to Nietzsche, but also his concern to move beyond what he sees as 
Nietzsche’s position. Yet, as Ulriche Haase (2007) has emphasized, this is an engagement in 
which Nietzsche is not dismissed. Rather, Heidegger treats him as a strong precursor with 
whom a specific kind of encounter is required. The struggle to find a distance from Nietzsche 
is the struggle to renew thought itself: ‘to understand Nietzsche as the end of metaphysics is 
the historical beginning of the future of Occidental thought’ (Heidegger cited by Haase 2007, 
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23). So polemos is constituted in direct relation to the equation of metaphysics with nihilism, 
and Heidegger’s endeavour to distinguish thinking from philosophy. Without engaging in a 
full exegesis of Heidegger’s complex and at times treacherous relationship with Nietzsche, a 
brief discussion of this passage in relation to the lecture course as a whole will illustrate my 
claim that the thinkers of agonism have not made what Heidegger presents here as the 
decisive move beyond Nietzsche. 
The context is Heidegger’s concern to explore the idea of truth as conflictual in its 
essence, an idea which he attributes to Greek thinking, and which he claims has been covered 
over by subsequent thought (i.e. nihilism): 
we do not understand to what extent the essence of truth is, in itself, a conflict. If, however, in the 
primordial thinking of the Greeks the conflictual essence of truth was experienced, then it cannot astonish 
us to hear, in the dicta of this primordial thinking, precisely the word ‘conflict’. The interpretation of the 
Greek world by Jacob Burckhardt and Nietzsche has taught us to recognise the ‘agonal principle’ and to 
see in the ‘competitive match’ an essential ‘impulse’ in the ‘life’ of this people. But we must then go on 
to ask where the principle of the ‘agon’ is grounded and whence the essence of ‘life’ and of man receives 
its determination so that it is ‘agonal’. (Heidegger 1992, 18)  
In going beyond Nietzsche, Heidegger pursues an enquiry into the grounds of agonism. In 
other words, both the mode of doing philosophy (Auseinandersetzung/polemos) and that 
which it seeks to uncover (Auseinandersetzung/polemos) exceed the anthropological and 
historical enquiry to which Nietzsche, Heidegger suggests, appeals. The result is to move the 
horizon to which our gaze is directed from the city governed by contest to the cosmic strife 
within which the city is itself located. Both the method and the results of the enquiry have 
political consequences. 
Firstly, there is a challenge to the anthropocentric and anthropomorphic tendency of 
agonist thinking. In his lecture course on the pre-Socratic philosophers, Nietzsche had 
suggested that Heraclitus had identified justice with conflict on the basis of a metaphorical 
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transfer from his experience of Greek life:  
This is one of the most magnificent notions: strife as the continuous working out of a unified, lawful, 
reasonable justice, a notion that was produced from the deepest fundament of the Greek being […] From 
the gymnasium, musical competitions and political life Heraclitus becomes familiar with the paradigm of 
such strife. (Nietzsche 2001, 64) 
Nietzsche’s position here is that of the cultural historian, the sociological debunker of 
ideology or the thinker of human life in terms of language games: philosophy is the product 
and reflection of particular ways of living and perceiving the world. Knowing only himself 
and his society, man projects his own categories onto the world. Against this claim to have 
uncovered the ground of philosophical activity, Heidegger reasserts something like the 
ambiguity of Heraclitus’s discovery, since there is no measure by which we might determine 
whether the city replicates cosmic justice or the vision of cosmic balance is simply the wishful 
projection of the citizen. In other words, the thinking of polemos refuses to decide whether the 
relationship between the philosopher and justice is one of blindness or insight, and whether 
the relationship between the city and justice is one of harmony, or hubris. The overcoming of 
metaphysics thus entails a problematic relationship to philosophy, in which the only true path 
for philosophy is a recursive destruction of its own history in order to uncover a more original 
way of thinking: more original in the sense of having a more profound relationship to the 
strife of Being, predicated on the need to overcome the contemporary technological world as 
the completion of metaphysics in nihilism. 
In his own essay on Heidegger’s understanding of polemos, Derrida (1993) suggests 
that one of the former’s concerns in this period might have been to distinguish his 
understanding of conflict from the anthropological sense of war on which Schmitt’s concept 
of the political is founded. For Schmitt (1976, 35), polemos is the fundamental possibility of 
the political entity, whose very existence is only properly given in the act of declaring war. 
For Heidegger, by contrast, polemos as Being must by its very nature exceed the city. This is 
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a point stressed by Heidegger several times in his lectures on Holderlin’s Der Ister: 
The pre-political essence of the polis, that essence that first makes possible everything political in the 
originary and in the derivative sense, lies in its being the open site of that fitting-destining [Schickung] 
from out of which all human relations towards beings […] are determined. (Heidegger 1996, 82) 
Indeed the fate of the city is something more like an effect of contending fortunes at the 
higher level: that is the chaotic unfolding of successive epochs of Being. If the city is that in 
which man finds his being, the city will only find its being within a larger struggle. To 
conceive of this struggle means taking seriously the possibility of the demise or dissolution of 
the city, and therefore removes the question of taking a stand for or against the city from the 
remit of philosophy. 
If, for Schmitt, political theory is oriented towards a decision that exceeds the 
theoretical because it is a matter of practice (cf. Derrida 1997, 114), for Heidegger philosophy 
is oriented towards a decision that exceeds the practical because it exceeds the human. 
Decision for Heidegger is not to be thought in anthropological terms, as the choice made by 
an agent between two courses of action, nor as a process or activity of being, but as something 
more like the original division or setting adrift of being. Accordingly, the Contributions to 
Philosophy is rich in statements in which it becomes clear that the rewriting of history as the 
unfolding of being happens across and through the individual and the city, but cannot be 
identified with either. A 1953 clarification added to the Introduction to Metaphysics reminds 
us that ‘de-cision here does not mean the judgement and choice of human beings, but rather a 
division in the aforementioned togetherness of Being, unconcealment, seeming and not-
Being’ (Heidegger 2000, 116). Derrida’s reading of Heidegger is generous in the sense that 
we might postulate less philosophical reasons for the latter to wish to distinguish the struggle 
of being with the war in which Germany was currently engaged. In the Contributions 
Heidegger seems to sense the danger of identifying national and philosophical destiny, which 
is present not only in his work of the Rectorate period but remains visible whenever he links 
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philosophy to the German language. 
A second consequence of Heidegger’s identification of philosophy with enquiry into 
truth as the grounds of agonistic competition clarifies the problem of mapping the ontic-
ontological difference onto the distinction between politics and the political. Greek thinking is 
‘primordial’ in Heidegger’s terms not because Greek philosophy knows a truth which modern 
thinking cannot recover, nor because Greek experience reveals the ground of their thought, as 
Nietzsche implies. Rather, primordial here indicates an experience of that which comes before 
the origin, but which remains withdrawn from thought. It is not a lost past but that which 
remains to come, and on which thinking remains able to draw, albeit not without a recursive 
movement in which destruction and recovery are inseparably conjoined. We might think of 
this as precisely the ambiguity of Heraclitus’s thinking: the impossibility of determining the 
relationship between law and justice because of the withholding of justice as the ground of 
law. Justice functions as ground whether we consider it divine or human, transcendent or 
immanent. But it is inseparable from the laws through which it is manifest and from which it 
is absent. Polemos means thinking the complication of this relationship rather than its 
clarification.  
To characterize as Heideggerean the recent tendency to distinguish ‘politics’ from the 
‘political’, as Oliver Merchant (2007) does, is misleading. The thrust of Heidegger’s work is 
to ground philosophical enquiry on the distinction between the ontic (which would include all 
human activity, political or otherwise) and the ontological (Being). This must entail a 
suspicion about the possibility of drawing Being into political argument and, thus, about the 
political availability of philosophy. The tracing of the difference between the ontic and the 
ontological (by which method alone Being can be brought into our reckoning) is in part the 
bringing to appearance of that which cannot be calculated or reckoned with. The possibility 
that such a tracing can give rise to a new or improved form of calculation must remain 
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radically in abeyance. Anything that could be a foundation would have been recuperated 
theoretically. 
This radically aporetic account of the relationship between the enquiry of the 
philosopher and his or her activity as a citizen also directs us to suspect any attempt to 
reground politics in something which exceeds theoretical reason. The difference between 
Arendt and Derrida is illuminating on this point because it illustrates two divergent responses 
to Heidegger. Accepting the suspicion of theory, Arendt requires a new ground for politics, 
which she finds in action, maintaining the modern relationship between political theory and 
the history of freedom, but with history construed as the fortunate and unpredictable sequence 
of emancipatory beginnings. Derrida, who might be said to agree with Arendt insofar as he 
sees a free decision as being in excess of any rational calculation of ends, goes on to suspect 
any possible identification of such a decision. The possibility of free action for Arendt is 
demonstrated by reference to a series of key (but fleeting) examples. For Derrida, that 
possibility is precisely that which cannot be demonstrated. Once an action or event had been 
identified, providing an example to be imitated, access to political freedom would be blocked 
rather than opened. When Derrida insists on the impossibility of certain kinds of an event, of 
forgiveness, of decision, he is not arguing that they never happen, but that any kind of 
thinking which begins from the presumption of their existence will be less likely rather than 
more likely to cultivate them. Arendt’s turn to philosophy of praxis might be contrasted with 
Derrida’s own response to Heidegger. Rather than turn away, he seeks to continue to think 
philosophy as the deconstruction of metaphysics, and sustains the ontological orientation of 
Heidegger’s work. Against Heidegger, Derrida insists on the history of political institutions 
and vocabularies not as the destruction of original truth but as a fortunate but unpredictable 
sequence of events which continue to shelter certain positive possibilities. In contrast to 
Arendt, our attention is turned not to founding acts but to the betrayal of such events in their 
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subsequent institutionalisation without which they would have no originary force. 
This leads Derrida to a very different position from that of Heidegger. Take for example 
the implications of Derrida’s (1999; Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000) work on the notion of 
hospitality, which is conceived as an interrogation of the political and conceptual grammar 
governing both the theory and practice of the relationship between the modern democratic 
state and the fact of immigration. As a duty, Derrida argues, the offering of hospitality ought 
to be unlimited. In practice, our capacity for offering hospitality is restricted, not only by the 
physical or practical considerations such as resources, but by the conceptual problem that 
identity depends on the maintenance of borders, and that therefore the identity on which my 
capacity to offer hospitality depends will always contravene the duty to offer hospitality. The 
real failure of states – now, as in history – to offer unlimited hospitality to refugees, asylum 
seekers or economic migrants stems from the restriction of certain kinds of goods to its own 
citizens. Hospitality can only be offered to the extent that one remains a host, that one 
commands and regulates a space of refuge. This argument implies but does not depend upon 
the inadequation of any act of hospitality to an ideal. But it goes further in showing the ideal 
of hospitality to be itself incoherent, pulled apart not so much by conflicting or aporetic duties 
but by the conceptual paradox involved in the single obligation to offer shelter. In practical 
terms, this suggests that the debate over immigration will be interminable because 
programmed into the modern ideal of democracy conceived as universal brotherhood. 
Derrida’s work evokes this interminable conflict while refusing to assume the responsibility 
for setting limits to it in practice or in theory. As Derrida comments in Rogues:  
one will never actually be able to ‘prove’ that there is more democracy in granting or in refusing the right 
to vote to immigrants … nor that there is more or less democracy in a straight majority vote as opposed to 
proportional voting. (Derrida 2005, 36) 
If there is a political principle in Derrida’s work it is this: that the ability of the political 
community to cultivate its own affairs, to protect itself, the extent of its own self-governance, 
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depends on a constitutive relation with its outside. Absolute closure, like absolute openness, 
would be the dissolution of the political body. This places the political community always and 
immediately into contradiction with democracy, since the ground for political equality before 
the law, isonomia will always be restricted not only de facto (every city we know has walls) 
but de jure (to be a city it must have walls). The burden of the language of democracy in 
Derrida’s work is to highlight this contradiction within our inherited conception of politics, 
which does not stem from a moral or religious insertion of equality into a conception of 
politics to which it is alien, but from the emergence of democracy as such. Derrida’s 
insistence on a democracy ‘to-come’ is a reminder that what might be described as a tragic 
diremption of politics from democracy is also the opening of its possibility, and of all the 
contestations of power in the name of equality and freedom to which history attests. 
This need not be understood as a radical replacement or rejection of the tradition, but 
more as the aspiration to renew the self-understanding of political philosophy. To this extent, 
Derrida can be seen as rejecting the Heideggerean problematic of the history of metaphysics 
as nihilism. For example, it is possible to give an account of Aristotle’s thought which is very 
close to my presentation of Derrida’s. In his work on Aristotle, Yack (1999, 288; cf. 1993) 
argues that political community is precisely that form of social organization which fosters 
possibilities of cooperation which go beyond those enabled within the family or clan, but that 
must necessarily enable new forms of distrust: ‘as in a family business, these affinities raise 
expectations of disinterested behaviour and sympathy which tend to intensify distrust and turn 
disagreements about advantage into suspicion of betrayal.’ For Yack’s Aristotle, and I suggest 
for Derrida, the political difference between dissensus and consensus is merely a matter of 
rhetoric. Politics is required by, is the very experience of, the existence of a political 
community in which decisions are made on behalf of the whole, but in which there is 
disagreement about means and ends. Taken to extremes, both disagreement and agreement 
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threaten the destruction of politics: politics is the specific realm between identity (or pre-
political community) and the destructive separation of the city into two factions. There can be 
no ground for either difference or unity as rhetorical strategies. 
Franco Volpi (2007, 32) has argued that the rehabilitation of the question of ‘praxis’ in 
German political philosophy owes a great deal to those students of Heidegger who rejected 
his ‘appropriation’ of Aristotle’s practical philosophy for ontological purposes. Via the 
example and inspiration of Hannah Arendt, of critical theory and of the French return to 
Nietzsche, this swerve away from the deconstruction of metaphysics towards a practical 
foundation of political thought might be seen as an exemplary forerunner of political agonism. 
My aim in this essay has simply been to distinguish those thinkers of praxis from that other 
thinking which might more properly be called deconstructive. On occasion Derrida calls this 
latter mode ‘hauntological’, the pun, in French at least, indicating the latter’s continuity with, 
as well as its unsettling of, ontology a traditionally conceived. The consequences of pursuing 
such a deconstruction of ontology might be seen as something like a studied indifference to 
politics, because it requires us to see the fate of politics within a larger frame, in which 
something more like a cosmology may eclipse the possibility of the cosmopolitical. The 
practice of this philosophical indifference need not in itself be anti-political, as I have shown 
in relation to Derrida’s thinking. Indeed it is an essential claim of deconstruction that such 
indifference is the necessary precondition for a thinking of politics which would be open to 
the future. 
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